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CIVIL CONTEMPT CONFINEMENT AND
THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005:
AN EXAMINATION OF DEBTOR INCARCERATION
IN THE MODERN AGE
Jayne S. Ressler*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much attention has been paid in recent months to the plight of Matthew
Cooper and Judith Miller, the journalists held in contempt of court for
refusing, despite court order, to name their sources regarding the identity of a
CIA operative.' Although Mr. Cooper's employer, Time Inc., later agreed to
comply with the court order and reveal Mr. Cooper's informant, Ms. Miller,
a New York Times reporter, steadfastly refused to "snitch., 2 Ms. Miller,
therefore, was imprisoned for civil contempt. 3 After spending several months
in jail Ms. Miller did name her source, thereby complying with the court
order, and she was promptly set free.4
These journalists' refusal to testify and reveal their sources has
dramatically brought to the public's attention the practice of confinement for
civil contempt. Recent changes to the bankruptcy laws create a potential for
* Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., University of
Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania; B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania. My thanks and gratitude to Patricia Biswanger, Dana Brakman-
Reiser, H. Beatty Chadwick, Ted Janger, and Heidi Kitrosser for their suggestions and
comments on previous drafts of this Article, and to Robert Ferreri, Gavin Goldstein, and Kelly
Kocinski for their invaluable research assistance. I am also grateful to Dean Joan Wexler for
her generous support of this project through the Brooklyn Law School Research Stipend. I
could not have written this Article without the advice, encouragement, sense of humor, and
endless patience of my husband, Ken Rose. Finally, a depth of gratitude to my son, Nate Rose,
for remaining in utero and allowing me to finish the first draft of this Article before making
his appearance in the world.
1. See Adam Liptak, Prosecutor in Leak Case Calls for Reporters' Jailing, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A14.
2. Adam Liptak, Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name Source; Case of C.I.A.
Operative; Journalist for The Times-2nd Reporter Will Speak to Grand Jury, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 2005, at Al.
3. Id.
4. Katharine Q. Seelye, Freed Reporter Says She Upheld Principles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 2005, at A20.
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
civil contempt to affect a much larger number of people who will never,
however, get the attention lavished on Mr. Cooper and Ms. Miller.
In order to minimize the abuses allegedly present in the prior bankruptcy
system, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
20055 was designed to make it more difficult for people to declare
bankruptcy.6 The new Bankruptcy Code likely will result in fewer people
receiving bankruptcy protection. Thus, many more people may face potential
imprisonment for civil contempt resulting from failure to pay a court-ordered
debt. This imprisonment, even if for a short duration, can have life-long
consequences, both for those who are incarcerated and for those who depend
upon them. It is essential, therefore, to examine the current state of civil
contempt law and propose changes for improvements to the system as it
relates to those in debt.
Those in jail for civil contempt are deemed to "hold the key" to their
cells-in the case of Judith Miller, all she needed to do to be set free was to
provide the court-ordered information. But a question arises regarding those
who have been imprisoned for failure to pay a court-determined debt--do
they truly hold the key to their cells? Unlike journalists whose key (their
sources) is readily obtainable and is contained in their minds (or in an easily
accessible file), many of those imprisoned for contempt of court for failure to
pay a court-ordered debt maintain that they do not have the funds to free
themselves.
With the new bankruptcy laws severely limiting the circumstances in
which a debtor can declare bankruptcy and thereby receive protection from
his creditors,7 an increasing number of debtors may be vulnerable to
indefinite jail sentences. This is due in part to the currently inadequate
procedural protections in place to prevent a debtor from unjust incarceration.
Moreover, there is a lack of uniformity with respect to the standards for
obtaining and reviewing the financial documentation that reflects a debtor's
ability to pay. In addition, the contemnor is vulnerable to possible
inadvertent prejudice from the presiding judge in a contempt proceeding. A
judge's perception of defiance of the court's authority might induce her to
5. Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (amending scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
6. See, e.g., Charles W. Pickering, Pickering's Mississippi E-Meno No. 25, Apr. 15,
2005, http://www.house.gov/pickering/old/EMemo25.htm. In the "E-memo" Mississippi
Congressman Pickering stated that the Act "ensures [that] only those who truly need to
declare bankruptcy do so, and makes it more difficult for those who use bankruptcy as a tool
for fraud to cheat their way out of debt." Id.
7. See infra Part V.
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take a contemnor's actions personally-to the detriment of the contemnor.
Further, after imprisonment the "lock" may have changed so that the initial
court-fashioned "key" will no longer open it. For example, one jailed
contemnor has seen his liability increase from an initial amount of $2.5
million to over $4 million.8
The complex nature and critical consequences of the determination as to
whether a debtor truly "holds the key to his cell" require more procedural
protections than the civil contempt system currently affords. Indeed, serious
consideration should be given to the rationale--or lack thereof-for
imposing imprisonment to coerce the payment of money at all. Where a
debtor has the ability to pay, award of execution, attachment, garnishment or,
where applicable, a constructive trust, are available. If the debtor does not
have the ability to pay, she should not be adjudicated to be in contempt in the
first place, and certainly no amount of confinement will be able to coerce
payment. Moreover, there is virtually no possibility that the contemnor will
earn sufficient assets to pay the amount ordered if he is in prison.
Consequently, there is little value in imposing indefinite imprisonment when
a court attempts to enforce an order for a money payment.
In this Article, I first review the history of imprisonment for debt. I
discuss how the practice first crossed the Atlantic from Europe and was
eventually all but abolished in this country. Next, I evaluate both the
instances in which imprisonment for debt is imposed, either by statute or by
common law, and the prohibitions against the practice. The Article then
examines the conventional distinctions between civil and criminal contempt.
I next discuss the methods behind the determination of the inability of a
debtor to comply with a court-ordered debt, and review the results of such a
finding. In so doing, I analyze the burden of proof, the right to a jury trial,
and the length of confinement. What follows is an evaluation of the relevant
provisions of the new Bankruptcy Code, and an explanation as to why they
raise additional concerns regarding civil contempt and imprisonment for
debt.
8. See Keith Rosenblum, Debtor's Prison: Manuel Osete Has Been in Jail for 27
Months, with No Release in Sight. His Crime? He Didn't Commit One, TUCSON WKLY., Mar.
24, 2005, at 9, available at http://www.tucsonweekly.com/gbase/Currents/Content?oid=66973
(noting that jailed lawyer H. Beatty Chadwick, imprisoned for over nine years for refusing to
hand over $2.5 million to his ex-wife, has seen his liability increase to $4.2 million, and
Manuel Osete, also imprisoned over a financial dispute resulting from his divorce, has seen
his liability rise from $500,000 to $833,000).
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With an eye toward correcting some of the flaws in the current
debtor/contempt dynamic, I propose several reforms to the present system.
First, I recommend that courts consider the varied consequences of
imprisonment of debtors. I then examine the judiciary's multifaceted societal
role and advocate that courts look beyond the strict letter of the law and
analyze the broad effects upon society of judgments in debtor civil contempt
cases. I propose that Sixth Amendment distinctions between civil and
criminal contempt be eliminated and all defendants facing imprisonment for
civil contempt be given the same due process rights as those afforded
criminal defendants. To provide uniformity and fairness to the crucial
determination as to whether a debtor has the ability in fact to comply with a
court order, I then propose that a specialized judge or magistrate be
responsible in the first instance for overseeing the compilation and review of
an alleged debtor's financial documents. The specialized judge or magistrate
should also be involved with post-conviction hearings and appeals,
informing the presiding judge of changes in the contemnor's finances, as
well as opining on whether the debtor is indeed able to pay the debt. The
goal of these recommendations is to provide fair, informed, and impartial
guidelines to a process that is currently ad hoc and unpredictable.
II. IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
A. A Brief History of Imprisonment for Debt
1. Ancient Rome
The earliest known instance of imprisonment for debt is found in the
third of the Twelve Tables, the first written laws of Rome, which were
drafted around 451 B.C.9 Indeed, the only occasion for imprisonment
specified in the Twelve Tables occurs in the law concerning debt,10 which
provided:
9. See John Paul Adams, The Twelve Tables (451-450 B.C.), http://www.csun.edu/
%7EHCFLL004/12tables.html (last visited June 3, 2006) (stating that the Twelve Tables were
"the earliest attempt by the Romans to create a CODE OF LAW [and] the earliest (surviving)
piece of literature coming from the Romans").
10. See THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN
WESTERN SOCIETY 14 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1998) [hereinafter OxFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON].
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When debt has been acknowledged, or judgment about the matter had been
pronounced in court, thirty days must be the legitimate time of grace. After
that, then arrest of debtor may be made by laying on hands. Bring him into
court. If he does not satisfy the judgment, or no one in court offers himself as
surety on his behalf, the creditor may take the defaulter with him. He may
bind him either in stocks or in chains; he may bind him with weight not less
than fifteen pounds or with more if he shall so desire. The debtor, if he shall
wish it, may live on his own. If he does not live on his own, the person [who
shall hold him in bonds] shall give him one pound of grits for each day. He
may give more if he shall so desire. On the third market day, creditors shall
cut pieces .... Should they have cut more or less than their due, it shall be
with impunity."
l
In short, "[d]ebtors who could not or would not pay [a debt] were to be held
in private confinement by their creditors and were to have their debts
publicly announced on three successive market days, on the last of which
they might be executed or sold into slavery." 12 At no point, however, did the
state itself express an interest in the debt; rather, the state interceded only to
ensure that the debtor remained available to the creditor, and then specified
the limits of the creditor's rights against the debtor. And in no case was the
debtor subject to an indefinite term of confinement-although, with
execution or enslavement as the alternatives, some no doubt would have
preferred prolonged imprisonment.
2. England
Incarceration for debt became well established in England when the
Debtors' Act of 1350, enacted under Edward III, extended to private
creditors the ability to imprison debtors for debt. 13 The intention of
imprisonment was to coerce. 14  Incarceration was not seen as
counterproductive, as it might appear to be to modern eyes-after all, how
11. See 3 REMAINS OF OLD LATIN: LuctLIus, THE TWELVE TABLES 424-515 (E. H.
Warmington ed. & trans., 1979), available at http://members.aol.com/pilgrimjon/private/
LEX/12tables.html.
12. OXFORD HISTORY OFTHE PRISON, supra note 10, at 14.
13. See id. at 271. Prior to the Debtor's Act of 1350, imprisonment for debt had been
limited to those who owed money to the Crown. Id.
14. Id.
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could a person in prison work or otherwise raise funds to pay off the debt? 5
Imprisonment sometimes did coerce a debtor into making payment, if he was
able to raise money from friends and relatives (this, of course, compelled the
debtor to incur even more debt), but imprisonment very often failed, with
people often held for years for trifling sums. 16 Further complicating matters
was that a creditor was prohibited from seizing his debtor's chattels or taking
other action to recover money once the debtor was incarcerated. 7 As a result,
some debtors would choose to remain in prison for life to preserve their
property and possessions for family and heirs.
18
The civil process leading to imprisonment continued to be viewed as a
means of securing the debtor until the debt was paid, rather than as
punishment. 19 There was arrest on mesne process, which allowed the debtor
to be arrested and imprisoned prior to trial in order to ensure his or her
presence at trial.20 The creditor had power over the person of the debtor but
did not possess the right to obtain the debtor's assets to satisfy the debt.
21
Thus, the state's role was merely to maintain creditor relations by providing
a place of confinement for those who had betrayed a trust.
22
In 1813, the Insolvent Debtors Act created the Court for the Relief of
Insolvent Debtors, which could order the release of debtors from prison upon
application to the Justice of Peace and creation of a schedule of assets. 3 In
the first six years of its operation, the court released more than 15,000
debtors owing almost £11 million, but the amount recovered and filed in
court reached only £60,000.24 In 1840, a report presented to Parliament stated
that there had been no recovery in ninety-five percent of the cases.2 5
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 119.
20. See V. MARKHAM LESTER, VICTORIAN INSOLVENCY: BANKRUPTCY, IMPRISONMENT
FOR DEBT, AND COMPANY WINDING-UP IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 89 (1995).
21. Id.
22. Even so, certain restrictions were imposed on the ability of creditors to seize
debtors. Debtors could not be arrested within the precincts of a royal palace, and could not be
arrested on Sundays. See OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 10, at 279.
23. See The National Archives, Bankrupts and Insolvent Debtors: 1710-1869,
http://www.catalogue.nationalarchives.gov.uk/RdLeaflet.asp?sLeafletlD=-145 (last visited
Sept. 4, 2006); see also LESTER, supra note 20, at 99.
24. LESTER, supra note 20, at 99.
25. Id.
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In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, according to another
parliamentary report, the number of debtors imprisoned totaled
approximately 10,000 each year.26 Debtors incarcerated in England often
brought their wives and children to the prison, 7 and babies were even born
in jail.28 These children would live out their lives in prison with their debtor
parent.29
Commerce flourished in the English debtors' prison. In some instances
debtors were required to rent space from jailers, and to buy food and drink
from them.30 Debtors were thus customers, and jailers, as all good
businessmen will, cultivated their best paying clients. 31 Debtors also often
sold goods and services to others confined.32 Indeed, in the 1860s a debtor
could follow his trade and retain earnings in prison.33 The conditions of
confinement thus frequently depended on the wealth of the debtor, and not
on his misdeed. 34
The 1895 Gladstone Committee on prisons, however, had reasoned that
all debtors were criminal because they had caused a loss, through their
recklessness or dishonesty, to their creditors. Unpaid debt was viewed as
similar to stealing.35 After the Gladstone findings, debtors' privileges were
restricted and, in the official view, debtors were regarded as little better than
criminals.
36
26. Id. at 97.
27. See CHARLES DICKENS, Lrrl. DoRRrr 73-75, 80-81 (Stephen Wall & Helen Small
eds., Penguin Books rev. ed. 2003) (1857). Dickens describes a debtor's arrival at the
Marshalsea Prison, where the debtor expected that he would be "going out again directly." Id.
at 73. But soon the debtor sent for "a few necessary articles of furniture to be delivered by the
carrier," as well as his expectant wife and two children. Id. at 74 (internal quotation marks
omitted). He reasoned that it was "better that [they] should not be scattered, even for a few
weeks." Id. at 74-75 (internal quotation marks omitted). Years later, the debtor's child born in
the Marshalsea is an adult, her mother long dead, and her father, still in debtors' prison, is
known as the "Father of the Marshalsea." Id. at 80-81.
28. OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 10, at 272.
29. Id.
30. See 1 SEAN MCCONVILLE, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH PRISON ADMINISTRATION: 1750-
1877, at 10 (1981).
31. See id.
32. See id. at 17-18.
33. See OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 10, at 146.
34. See id. at 275.
35. Id. at 277.
36. Id. at 146.
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But there soon emerged campaigns for changes in the law, spurred by the
debtors' miserable lives and misfortune. 3 7 Public outrage mounted as debtors
were trapped for appallingly long periods of time in terrible conditions.38
Eventually, philanthropic societies arose that would settle the debts of the
poor and give them their freedom. 39 "The last jail in England exclusively for
debtors-the Queen's Prison-closed in 1862 and was demolished in
1868." 4 Nevertheless, "the fiction that one was being jailed for contempt of
court, and not for debt, allowed people to be imprisoned in England for
private debts until the 1960s and for public debt, such as local taxes, even
[today]."41
3. America
Early on in America's history, debtor's prisons were disfavored.42
Indeed, the colony of Georgia was founded with the intention that it be a
haven for poor debtors.43 This was based on the notion that the New World
should offer a fresh start to those afflicted with bad luck.
44
Thus, distaste for coercive incarceration in the New World and unease
with the jailing of debtors is evident from the beginnings of the Republic.45
Some state constitutions prohibited imprisonment of debtors, but others
continued the English tradition.46 Pennsylvania, for example, as both a
colony and a state, took steps to ameliorate the practice, but did not forbid it
until 1842.47 And as recently as 1969, Maine debtors were jailed for "failing
37. See id. at 276.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 277.
40. Id. at 278.
41. Id. at 277.
42. See, e.g., BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 2-3 (2002).
43. See OxFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 10, at 278.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. In fact, Robert Morris, the "Financier of the American Revolution," was
imprisoned for debt in Philadelphia for almost three years after some investments failed. See
Kevin Messett, Biographical Sketch of Robert Morris, http://www.pabook.libraries.psu.edu/
LitMap/bios/MorrisRobert.html (last visited June 3, 2006); ColonialHall.com, Robert
Morris: 1733-1806, http:llwww.colonialhall.comlmorrisr/morrisr5.php (last visited June 3,
2006). Convinced that a strong national government would solve the new nation's economic
problems, Morris crafted a plan to create a stable economic base for the Confederation,
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to obey the repayment instructions of court-appointed officials. ' 8 While
"coercive imprisonment for private debt ceased in most jurisdictions in the
nineteenth century," other forms of debtor imprisonment, often masked by
the fiction of contempt of court, continue today.49
B. Imprisonment for Debt Based on Statutory Authority
Courts frequently order imprisonment for those who are in arrears on
child support or other family-related obligations, but the length of
confinement is prescribed by statute, and due process protections are built
into the scheme. 50 For example, the Federal Child Support Recovery Act
makes it a crime, punishable by as much as two years imprisonment,
willfully to fail to pay child support for a child who resides in another state
or willfully to travel in interstate or foreign commerce to evade a child
support obligation.5 1 "Deadbeat parents" prosecuted under this statute are not
including paper money backed by a national bank with silver and gold on deposit. See
ColonialHall.com, Robert Morris: 1733-1806, http://www.colonialhall.com/moriisr/
morrisr6.php (last visited June 6, 2006). Morris's measures led to lower inflation, and the new
nation began paying its vast war debt, but Morris was considerably less successful with his
personal finances. See id. For an interesting compilation of photographs reflecting aspects of
early American debtors' prisons, see Steve Rhode, The History of Credit & Debt,
http://www.myvesta.org/history/history-debtorprison.htm (last visited June 3, 2006).
48. OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 10, at 278.
49. Id. at 277.
50. See, e.g., Sinaiko v. Sinaiko, 664 A.2d 1005, 1008, 1015 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(affirming a fourteen-day commitment for contempt where a spouse had thwarted execution
on a judgment for counsel fees by placing assets out of reach of the execution process). The
Sinaiko court relied upon a provision in the Pennsylvania Divorce Code, see 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3502(e)(6) (West 2001), which authorizes attachment proceedings where a party
to a divorce action fails to comply with an equitable distribution order. Sinaiko, 664 A.2d at
1012-13. Under this section, however, attachment may issue only after a hearing.
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000). The Act also sets forth a presumption that, if the
support obligation was in effect for the time period charged in the indictment or information,
"the obligor has the ability to pay the support obligation for that time period." Id. § 228(b).
Some courts have found that this presumption violates due process because it shifts to the
defendant-obligor the burden of persuasion of the crime's willfulness element, and because
the inference required of the jury is arbitrary and unreasonable. See United States v. Grigsby,
85 F. Supp. 2d 100, 106-07 (D.R.I. 2000); see also United States v. Pillor, 387 F. Supp. 2d
1053, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that "the presumption in [18 U.S.C.] § 228(b) violates
due process"); United States v. Morrow, 368 F. Supp. 2d 863, 865 (C.D. Ill. 2005) ("[18
U.S.C.] § 228(b) is unconstitutional .... ").
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necessarily entitled to a jury trial.52 Many states have enacted similar statutes
criminalizing failure to pay court-ordered child support and specifically
providing for imprisonment in such cases.5 3 Most such statutes generally
permit a jury trial, however, and impose a specific length of confinement, so
due process concerns are not implicated.54
Some statutes governing divorce proceedings authorize imprisonment if
the contemnor fails to comply with an order to pay money or to deliver
property.55 These statutes enforcing family-related obligations, however,
often produce exactly the opposite of the result intended. In most cases it is
impossible to obtain support payments from a person who is unemployed and
in jail. Indeed, as discussed in Part V, the passage of the new Bankruptcy
Code makes this concern more pronounced as more debtors face potential
jail terms and the concomitant inability to earn an income.
C. Imprisonment for Debt Based on Court Order
Rooted in common law, courts have authorized imprisonment when a
contemnor refuses to disgorge, pursuant to court order, ill-gotten gains and
other assets.56 It is in these cases, where an indefinite term of confinement is
52. See, e.g., United States v. Narvaez, 279 F. Supp. 2d 82, 85 (D.P.R. 2003) (holding
that a jury trial is unnecessary for the "petty offense" under 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(1) of failure to
pay child support, because it carries a term of imprisonment of not more than six months).
53. See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 295 N.Y.S.2d 14, 14 (App. Div. 1968); see also D.C.
CODE § 11-944 (2005); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.031 (LexisNexis 2000). For an
overview of state statutes penalizing the failure to pay child support, see Annotation, Power
of Divorce Court, After Child Attained Majority, to Enforce by Contempt Proceedings
Payment ofArrears of Child Support, 32 A.L.R.3d 888 (1970 & Supp. 2004).
54. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 11-944.
55. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502(e)(6) (West 2001); see also Sinaiko v. Sinaiko,
664 A.2d 1005, 1014 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
56. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Armstrong, 284 F.3d 404, 407
(2d Cir. 2002) (dismissing an appeal from a contempt order even though the contemnor had
been imprisoned for over two years for failure to comply with a court order to turn over
almost $15 million worth of corporate assets); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Wellington Precious Metals, Inc., 950 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11 th Cir. 1992) (affirming contempt
imprisonment for refusal to comply with a court order to disgorge profits from fraudulent sale
of securities); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 481, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(awarding damages for diversion of proceeds of fraudulently procured loans, and ordering
arrest and confinement of individual defendants until such court-ordered damages were paid if
the defendants were found within the jurisdiction of the court), aff'd in part, vacated in part
by, remanded in part by 388 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2004).
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proposed and the only way the contemnor can "purge" his contempt is by
making the court-ordered payment, that it is essential that the contemnor's
due process rights be protected.
For example, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Armstrong,57 the Second Circuit upheld continuing incarceration for an
individual who failed to turn over approximately $14.9 million worth of
corporate assets to the court-appointed temporary receiver for his investment
firms.5s In Armstrong, the contemnor had been imprisoned since January 14,
2000, under the terms of an order scheduled to expire on July 14, 2001 .59 The
district court extended the confinement after a hearing in which it found that
the contemnor had "produced no evidence that he had either attempted or
was unable to comply with the contempt order."6 It opined that confinement
"'still serve[d] coercive purposes' in that 'it might yet yield its intended
result."' 61 The district court also concluded that the contemnor likely was
"'just... starting to feel some effects of his continued confinement' and the
'requisite degree of coercion.'
62
Affirming, the Second Circuit determined that the question before it was
whether the contemnor's confinement continued to have a coercive, rather
than punitive, purpose.63 Stating that the contemnor had the burden of
producing evidence that he could not comply with the order, and in view of
the unusually large sum of money involved, the Second Circuit held that
there was no basis for rejecting the district court's finding that the
contemnor's incarceration continued to serve a coercive function. 64 The
Second Circuit rejected the contemnor's argument that the length of his
confinement-at that point more than two years-combined with his
repeated declarations that he would not comply with the contempt order,
compelled the conclusion that he would never comply and that the order had
thus lost its coercive effect.
65
57. 284 F.3d 404 (2d Cir. 2002).
58. Id. at 405.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting SEC v. Princeton Econ. Int'l Ltd., 152 F. Supp. 2d 456, 458 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)).
62. Id. (quoting Princeton Econ. Int'l, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 463).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 406.
65. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit came to the same determination in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc.66 In that
case, the contemnor had been ordered to disgorge $2.8 million.67 Upon
failure to "make any payments whatsoever," the contemnor was ordered to
pay five percent of that amount or face jail time.68 Having paid nothing, he
was incarcerated.69 Several months later the contemnor filed a motion with
70the district court to terminate the contempt and release him from prison.
The district court rejected the contemnor's argument that he had earned only
$1.4 million from his illegal activities, and disbelieved his accounting for the
remaining $1.4 million.7' He therefore remained incarcerated.72
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the contemnor's insistence that
he had earned only $1.4 million from his illegal actions,73 and affirmed the
district court's holding that he had not provided sufficient evidence of
inability to pay.74 Noting that a contemnor "'must go beyond a mere
assertion of inability' ''75 and establish that he has made "'in good faith all
reasonable efforts"' to meet the terms of the court order,76 the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the contemnor's explanations
for the missing assets were "unworthy of belief.,
77
Contempt imprisonment also has been employed against defendants
accused of diverting the proceeds of fraudulently procured loans. 78 In
Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan,79 the Southern District of New York found it
"clear. . . that monetary sanctions [would] not suffice to bring defendants
into compliance with" the court's orders. 80 The court therefore ordered that
the debtors, foreign nationals who had swindled a creditor out of tens of
66. 950 F.2d 1525 (11 th Cir. 1992).
67. Id. at 1526.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 1527-28.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1528-29.
74. Id. at 1530.
75. Id. at 1529 (quoting United States v. Hayes, 722 F.2d 723, 725 (11th Cir. 1984).
76. Id. (quoting United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11 th Cir. 1988).
77. Id. at 1530.
78. See, e.g., Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 481, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2003),
affd in part, vacated in part by, remanded in part by 388 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2004).
79. 274 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
80. Id. at 582.
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millions of dollars, "if found within the jurisdiction of the United States,....
be immediately arrested and held in confinement until such time as they
comply with the directives" of the court.8'
Courts have found parties to be in contempt, with the threat of
imprisonment, in order to coerce the payment of a variety of fees and other
expenses that previously had been court-ordered. These include contempt
sanctions to enforce a HUD order for remittance into an escrow fund,82
contempt sanctions to enforce an order to pay attorneys' fees,83 and contempt
sanctions for failure to repay into the court registry amounts previously
withdrawn. 84 Failure to pay court-ordered fines85 and failure to pay court-
ordered sanctions86 have also been actions justifying contempt.
Not infrequently, bankruptcy courts will order the bankrupt or other
parties to "turn over" property, including money, for the benefit of
creditors.87 Bankruptcy courts also have noted their power to imprison on the
basis of contempt when a payment order is not obeyed.88 Where a money
judgment is involved, however, bankruptcy courts have recognized that the
use of the contempt power is usually not available because Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 69 requires the employment of a writ of execution, barring
special circumstances. 89
81. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Thom v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d 736, 737 (7th Cir.
1985) (ordering imprisonment where a former employee failed to pay a sum he was ordered to
disgorge).
82. See, e.g., Pierce v. Vision Invs., Inc., 779 F.2d 302, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1986).
83. See, e.g., Spain v. Bd. of Educ., 214 F.3d 925, 931 (7th Cir. 2000); Robbins v.
Labor Transp. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 705, 706-07 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
84. See, e.g., Piambino v. Bestline Prods., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1210, 1216 (S.D. Fla.
1986).
85. See, e.g., In re Spanish River Plaza Realty Co., 155 B.R. 249, 256 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1993).
86. See, e.g., Verone v. Taconic Tel. Corp., 826 F. Supp. 632, 633 (N.D.N.Y. 1993);
O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 218, 221-22 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
87. See, e.g., Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 362, 366-67 (1929) (affirming an order
under which "the bankrupt was directed to turn over to his trustees merchandise and money
amounting... to about $10,000"); see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)(B) (2000) (stating that the
commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding creates an "estate" that is comprised of, with
limited exceptions, "[a]ll interests of the debtor ... that is [sic] ... liable for an allowable
claim against the debtor").
88. See, e.g., Spanish River Plaza Realty, 155 B.R. at 254-56.
89. See In re Eickhoff, 259 B.R. 234, 235-36 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000).
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D. Prohibitions on Imprisonment for Debt
Notwithstanding the above, American law expresses a general
disapproval of civil imprisonment. Indeed, a federal statute prohibits federal
imprisonment for debt in any state where such imprisonment has been
abolished. 90 Outright imprisonment as a penalty for violating commercial
obligations, except in cases of fraud, has been abolished in every state.91
Civil confinement of the mentally ill is limited to cases where they are a
danger to themselves or others.92 Sexual predators generally can be confined
after the expiration of their criminal sentence only when they are found to be
dangerous and mentally ill.93 Deportable aliens can be confined only for a
limited time without violating the Due Process Clause, unless the
confinement has been ordered in a criminal proceeding or in "special and
narrow nonpunitive circumstances" where a "special justification" outweighs
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2007(a) (2000) ("A person shall not be imprisoned for debt on a writ of
execution or other process issued from a court of the United States in any State wherein
imprisonment for debt has been abolished. All modifications, conditions, and restrictions upon
such imprisonment provided by State law shall apply to any writ of execution or process
issued from a court of the United States in accordance with the procedure applicable in such
State.").
91. See Note, Imprisonment for Debt: In the Military Tradition, 80 YALE L.J. 1679,
1679 (1971); see also Becky A. Vogt, Note, State v. Allison: Imprisonment for Debt in South
Dakota, 46 S.D. L. REV. 334, 334-35 (2001). The Pennsylvania Constitution, for example,
contains a provision against imprisonment for debt. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 16. Pennsylvania
law has long held that an order for the payment of money, without more, does not warrant
attachment of the person. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 21 A. 807, 807 (Pa. 1891); Brodsky v.
Phila. Athletic Club, Inc., 419 A.2d 1285, 1288 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (observing that, absent
fraud, the abolition of imprisonment for debt prevents imprisonment to enforce a money
decree).
92. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). In Foucha, the Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he State may ... confine a mentally ill person if it shows 'by clear and
convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous."' Id. (quoting Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983)). The Court then concluded that a Louisiana statute
violated the Due Process Clause because it allowed an insanity acquittee to be committed to a
mental institution until he was able to demonstrate that he was no longer dangerous to himself
and others, even though he did not suffer from any mental illness. Id. at 81-83.
93. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-58, 371 (1997) (upholding the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01-29a15 (1994), which
establishes procedures for the civil commitment of persons who, due to a "mental
abnormality" or a "personality disorder," see § 59-29a07, are likely to engage in "predatory
acts of sexual violence," see § 59-29a02).
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the person's liberty interest.94 Even pretrial detention under the Bail Reform
Act has been upheld only because the incarcerated person is assured a
prompt hearing and because the Speedy Trial Act lirr-ts the length of pre-
trial confinement.95
Thus, it is evident that a creditor's rights against a debtor do not include
imprisonment, unless: (1) the imprisonment remedy is found in a statute, or
(2) a court holds the debtor in contempt after it orders payment to a creditor
and the debtor either resists, refuses, or is unable to comply.96 I discuss infra
Part IV the problems that arise with this second category of debtors.
HI. THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
To improve the current state of civil contempt law as it relates to debtors
it is necessary to examine the nature of the contempt power. "The power to
punish for contempts is inherent in all courts. 9 7 This power reaches both
conduct before the court and conduct beyond the court's confines, for "'[t]he
underlying concern that gave rise to the contempt power was not ... merely
the disruption of court proceedings. Rather, it was disobedience to the orders
of the Judiciary, regardless of whether such disobedience interfered with the
94. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court concluded that the indefinite detention of aliens
who were admitted to the United States but subsequently ordered removed would raise serious
constitutional concerns regarding a federal "post-removal-period statute," and, therefore,
construed the statute to contain an implicit "reasonable time" limitation, the application of
which would be subject to federal court review. Id. at 682 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(6) (1994
ed., Supp. V)).
95. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747-48 (1987). The Salerno Court held
that a portion of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2000), is a
constitutionally permissible limitation on liberty, in that it, in conjunction with other
provisions of the Act, "carefully limits the circumstances under which detention may be
sought to the most serious of crimes." Id. at 747 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1982 & Supp.
III)). "The arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention hearing, and the maximum length of
pretrial detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act." Id.
(citing 18 U. S. C. §§ 3161-3174).
96. One author argues that criminal penalties should be imposed for non-payment of
debt. See Richard E. James, Putting Fear Back into the Law and Debtors Back into Prison:
Reforming the Debtors' Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 143-45 (2002).
97. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1874)).
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conduct of trial.' ' 98 The Supreme Court has noted that "[c]ourts
independently must be vested with 'power to impose silence, respect, and
decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates."'
99
In an early seminal case dealing with contempt imprisonment, Gompers
v. Buck's Stove & Range Co.,1°° the Supreme Court distinguished between
imprisonment for punitive purposes and imprisonment for coercive
purposes, 10 a distinction that is honored to this day.' 0 2 Courts recognize,
however, that "most sanctions contain both coercive and punitive
elements."'' 0 3 Courts also recognize that "what starts as coercive can over
time become punitive" 4 because a contempt order may lose its coercive
effect during the course of the contemnor's confinement, "leaving
punishment as the sole justification for its maintenance."' 10 5
A distinction has also been drawn between contempt that is "direct" and
contempt that is "indirect." Contempt is direct when it occurs in the
immediate presence of the judge-under the court's own eye and within its
own hearing. °6 For example, if a lawyer blatantly disobeys a judge's order
during official court business, the judge instantly may rule that the lawyer
98. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuiton et Fils
S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798 (1987)).
99. Int'l Union, UMWA v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994) (quoting Anderson v.
Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227 (1821)).
100. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
101. See id. at 442-52 (holding that a twelve-month sentence imposed on labor activist
Samuel Gompers in a civil contempt proceeding had no coercive force and, therefore, was
punitive and could not be imposed consistent with the Due Process Clause without affording
criminal due process rights).
102. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Armstrong, 284 F.3d 404, 406
(2d Cir. 2002) ("In distinguishing criminal and civil contempt sanctions, we inquire whether
the sanction's purpose was to coerce compliance and whether the contemnor was given the
opportunity to cure his contempt and thereby end the sanction." (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
103. United States v. Lippitt, 180 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 1999).
104. Lippitt, 180 F.3d at 877 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Dec., 1989, 903
F.2d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Crededio, 759 F.2d 589, 590 (7th Cir. 1985); Simkin v.
United States, 715 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1983)).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., In re Heathcock, 696 F.2d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Direct
contempt is committed in the 'actual presence of the court."' (internal quotation marks
omitted)); United States v. Peterson, 456 F.2d 1135, 1139 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that
criminal contempt is direct and punishable summarily without notice and opportunity to
prepare only if committed in the actual presence of the judge and known to him).
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should spend a day or so in jail and direct the bailiff to arrest and remove her
from the court's presence. Thus, direct contempt for conduct in the court's
presence may be punished summarily, i.e., no separate notice or hearing is
required. °7 "If the judge finds a person in direct contempt of court, the judge
[typically] must sign and enter a written order that recites the facts as well as
the judgment and sentence."' 0 8
On the other hand, "contempt is indirect when it occurs out of the
presence of the court, thereby requiring the court to rely on the testimony of
third parties for proof of the offense." 9 Examples include preventing service
of process, bribing a witness, and failing to pay court-ordered child
support."l 0 Indirect contempt involves a hearing, providing the contemnor a
chance to prove any defenses."' Different substantive and procedural rules
apply depending on whether the contempt is classified as civil or criminal,
and direct or indirect.
112
The primary difference between civil and criminal contempt regards the
contemnor's sentence. Courts must sentence those guilty of criminal
contempt to a definite jail term, a punitive sentence." 3 Imprisonment for
civil contempt, on the other hand, is deemed to be coercive, and not punitive,
in that its purpose is to force the contemnor to comply with a court order.'
i4
There is no definite jail term, as the lack of a set period of confinement
indicates intent to coerce compliance.' 15 However, the line between coercion
107. See Peterson, 456 F.2d at 1139; see also Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 990-
91 (1997) (noting that where an attorney violated a trial court's instructions not to question her
client regarding punishment in the presence of the jury, the trial judge's findings concerning
jury prejudice, together with the judge's assessment of the flagrance of the attorney's
defiance, supported the finding of the need for summary contempt to vindicate the court's
authority).
108. JUDITH OLEAN, JUDICIAL EDUC. CTR., NEW MEXICO MUNICIPAL BENCHBOOK ch.
9.2 (2004) [hereinafter MUNICIPAL BENCHBOOK], available at http://jec.unm.edu/resources/
benchbooks/municipal/ch_09.htm.
109. U.S. Da'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 759 (1997) [hereinafter
CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-
room/usam/title9/crm00759.htm.
110. See MUNICIPAL BENCHBOOK, supra note 108, ch. 9.3.
111. See id.
112. See CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 109, §§ 754, 759, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crmO0754.htm and http://
www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crm00759.htm.
113. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-43 (1911).
114. Id. at 441-42.
115. Id.
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and punishment is exceedingly fine, as even a civil contemnor, though his
sanction is labeled "coercive," is in effect being "punished" for failing to
perform a past act-i.e., obeying a court order.
Although a court determination of the nature of the contempt is required,
the grounds by which to make this decision are murky and often confused.
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has noted that "'[flew legal concepts have
bedeviled courts, judges, lawyers and legal commentators more than
contempt of court.' 16 One commentator has noted that, regarding contempt
of court, "the law is' a mess."'1 7 To illustrate, in In re Stewart,'1 8 an
employer, Stewart, had demoted Stubblefield, his employee, because
Stubblefield had missed work due to jury duty. 1 9 The judge presiding over
the case in which Stubblefield was a juror initiated what he deemed to be a
civil contempt proceeding against Stewart, deeming his treatment of
Stubblefield as an affront to the court.12 0 He imposed a sentence of a $100
fine and costs, and put Stewart on unsupervised probation for three months
conditioned upon payment of the fine and costs and Stubblefield's
reinstatement to his former position. 21 However, the Fifth Circuit reversed
the ruling, deeming the proceedings and Stewart's sentence to be criminal,
not civil. 2 2 The Fifth Circuit noted that "the district judge imposed a penalty
that was unconditional and not subject to being lifted if Stewart purged
himself."'' 23 Further, the court examined the district judge's statement that "I
haven't had this to contend with too much, but I think I might as well just
make an example out of this fellow so I won't have to bother with this matter
again," and opined that it indicated a "crystal clear" intention to impose
punishment upon Stewart.' 24
Furthering the confusion, the Supreme Court has noted that "[clourts
often speak in terms of criminal contempt and punishment for remedial
purposes," but did not elaborate upon what "remedial purposes" meant or
116. Int'l Union, UMWA v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 n.3 (1994) (quoting Robert J.
Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal
Contempt, 50 U. CN. L. REv. 677 (1981)).
117. Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New
Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (1993).
118. 571 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1978).
119. See id. at 961-62.
120. See id. at 962-63.
121. See id. at 963.
122. Id. at 964, 968.
123. Id. at 963-64 (footnote omitted).
124. Id. at 964 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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how it has been utilized. 25 It is apparent that the distinction between civil
and criminal contempt, and the variations in between, are indeed
"'conceptually unclear and exceedingly difficult to apply."",126
However, determination of whether a contempt proceeding is criminal or
civil is particularly important because it governs whether the Due Process
Clause applies and whether a contempt hearing is required. 27 "Criminal
contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense,"1 28 and "criminal penalties may
not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections that
the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings."'' 29  These
constitutional protections include the right (1) not to be subject to double
jeopardy; 130 (2) to receive notice of the charges; 13 1 (3) to receive assistance of
counsel;' 32 (4) to receive summary process; 133 (5) to present a defense; 134 (6)
not to incriminate oneself;135 and (7) to be judged under the standard of proof
125. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369 (1966). In Shillitani, two men were
sentenced to a term of two years imprisonment with release conditioned upon either the men
answering questions that they had refused to answer in their grand jury testimony or the
discharge of the grand jury, whichever came first. Id. at 365-68. The district court labeled their
conduct criminal contempt. Id. at 366. However, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he fact that
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals called petitioners' conduct 'criminal
contempt' does not disturb our conclusion [that the proceedings and sentencing involved civil
contempt]." Id. at 369.
126. Int'l Union, UMWA v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 n.3 (1994) (quoting Dudley,
supra note 117, at 1033).
127. In Hicks v. Feiock, the Supreme Court held that if the lower court determined that
the contempt at issue was criminal in nature, a presumption of a father's ability to pay alimony
and child support would be an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause. 485 U.S.
624, 637-38 (1988). If, however, the action was civil in nature, then the presumption was not
such a violation. Id. at 638. The Court concluded that further proceedings had to be held in
order to determine whether the action was criminal or civil and whether the presumption was
activated. Id. at 640-41.
128. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
129. Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632.
130. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 109, § 754 (citing United States v.
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 695 (1993); In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943)), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crm00754.htm.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 515, 537 (1925)).
135. Id.
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beyond a reasonable doubt.' 36 If a sentence for contempt is deemed part
punitive and part coercive, then the criminal aspect dominates. 137 A court's
failure to make either any evaluation at all, or the correct assessment as to the
nature of the contempt, is itself grounds for reversal. 138 However, due
process is not required when a petitioner's contempt claim is answered only
by a conclusory assertion of inability to pay without the submission of
documentation supporting such a claim.1
39
An example of the effect and importance that the determination of the
nature of the contempt has on the process owed a contemnor is illustrated in
International Union, UMWA v. Bagwell (Bagwell II).14° In that case, a
Virginia state court found, in seven contempt hearings, that a mine workers
union had committed contempt via over four-hundred violations of an
injunction prohibiting strike-related activities. 14' The court had announced,
upon issuance of the injunction, that it would impose fines of a certain
amount in the event the violations continued. 42 "The [state] court [had]
required that [the contemptuous] acts [i.e., the violations of the injunction] be
prove[n] beyond a reasonable doubt, but did not afford the union a right to
jury trial." 14 3 The trial court fined the union $52 million, payable to the state
and two counties affected by the strike.144 The trial court characterized the
fines as "civil," given that they became payable only because the injunction
was disobeyed. 145 The union appealed, arguing that the fines were not
coercive civil fines but rather criminal fines that constitutionally could be
136. Id. (citing Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911)).
Further, according to the Department of Justice, serious criminal contempts involving
imprisonment of more than six months also require a jury trial. Id. (citing Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 199 (1968)).
137. In re Stewart, 571 F.2d 958, 964 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing Nye v. United States,
313 U.S. 33, 42-43 (1941)).
138. Id. at 963-64 (holding that the sentence of both fines and confinement was neither
coercive nor compensatory to the injured party, but was in fact criminal in nature and the
incorrect pronouncement of the contempt as civil was grounds for reversal).
139. See, e.g., Farkas v. Farkas, 618 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (App. Div. 1994). In Farkas, a
husband stated that due to the declining real estate market he was unable to comply with the
judgment against him, but did not provide any documentation detailing his claim. Id.
140. 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
141. See id. at 824.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 824-25.
145. See id. at 825.
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imposed only through a jury trial.' 46 The Court of Appeals of Virginia
reversed the case on other grounds, 47 but the Supreme Court of Virginia
subsequently reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. 148 Virginia's highest
court rejected the union's contention that the fines were criminal and could
not be imposed absent a trial, stating, "A prospective fine schedule was
established solely for the purpose of coercing the Union to refrain from
engaging in certain conduct. Consequently, the Union controlled its own fate.
Thus, we hold that the fines in question are valid, coercive, civil fines."'
149
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, stating simply: "We are called upon
once again to consider the distinction between civil and criminal
contempt." 5 '
The Supreme Court ruled that the contempt was criminal,1 51 but noted
"the somewhat elusive distinction between civil and criminal contempt.''
152
First, the Court concluded that the mere fact that the sanctions were
announced in advance of any fines actually being levied did not render them
coercive and civil as a matter of law. 53 Next, the Court noted that the
union's sanctionable conduct occurred outside the court's presence and did
not impede its ability to maintain order. These were factors weighing in favor
of labeling the contempt criminal and thus invoking due process
protections.1 54 Additional facts leading to the Court's determination of
criminal contempt were that the union's contumacy involved complex acts
and the fines were "serious."1 55 The Court also expressed concern about
abuses that could result where "the offended judge [was] solely responsible
for identifying, prosecuting, adjudicating, and sanctioning the contumacious
conduct,"'' 56 and cautioned that "the risk of erroneous deprivation from the
lack of a neutral factfinder [might] be substantial."'' 57
146. Int'l Union, UMWA v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 402 S.E.2d 899, 901 (Va. Ct. App.
1991), rev'd, Bagwell v. Int'l Union, UMWA (Bagwell 1), 423 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1992), rev'd,
Bagwell 11, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
147. See id. at 905 (vacating the contempt fines pursuant to a settlement agreement).
148. Bagwell I, 423 S.E.2d at 360.
149. Id. at 357.
150. Bagwel 11, 512 U.S. at 823.
151. Id. at 837-38.
152. Id. at 830.
153. Id. at 836.
154. Id. at 837.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 831.
157. Id. at 834.
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Bagwell H appears to
advocate review of the particulars of a court's initial order when determining
whether the contempt is civil or criminal, lower courts have been reluctant to
apply, let alone extend, its precepts. 5 8 Some courts have concluded that the
labeling of the contempt in Bagwell H as "criminal" simply reaffirmed the
traditional distinction between the two forms of contempt, making no change
in the prior law denying criminal due process in cases where the purpose of
the contempt sanction was to coerce performance and was conditional upon
non-compliance. 59 Other courts have applied Bagwell H to hold that if an
order alleged to have been violated is complex, extensive fact-finding is
necessary and a jury trial is required. 160 Still others have utilized the Supreme
Court's summation of existing law at the outset of the Bagwell H opinion to
hold that no jury trial is required in any civil contempt proceeding.161
158. Commenting on these decisions, one appellate court remarked that "it is not
surprising that district courts around the country, reluctant to surrender part of their power to
coerce obedience to their decrees, have resisted the logic of Bagwell [11]." Evans v. Williams,
206 F.3d 1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
159. See, e.g., In re Lucre Mgmt. Group, LLC, 365 F.3d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a sanction for violating a bankruptcy order could not be characterized as criminal
for Bagwell I purposes since the bankruptcy court gave the contemnor the "key" to his prison
cell); cf. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1137-40 (9th Cir.
2001) (stating that, under the principles articulated in Bagwell, "'the imposition of a
sufficiently substantial punitive sanction requires that the person sanctioned receive the
procedural protections appropriate to a criminal case' (quoting Mackler Prods., Inc. v.
Cohen, 146 F.3d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1998))).
160. Jake's Ltd. v. City of Coates, 356 F.3d 896, 903-04 (8th Cir. 2004) (requiring the
use of a jury trial regarding a claim of violation of an injunction against a sexually oriented
business); FTC v. Kuykendall, 312 F.3d 1329, 1342 (10th Cir. 2002) ("[W]e conclude that a
jury should be utilized to determine the complex facts necessary to render an appropriate
award."), vacated by, remanded by, on reh'g en banc at 371 F.3d 745, 754 (10th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that although the panel held that a contempt of a complex injunction required a
jury trial, in a civil contempt case there was no such requirement); United States v. Santee
Sioux Tribe of Neb., 254 F.3d 728, 736 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding a jury trial was not required
because the injunction alleged to be violated was not complex); Nat'l Org. for Women v.
Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 660-62 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that a jury trial was required
because of the complexity of the injunction).
161. ACLI Gov't Sec., Inc. v. Rhoades, 989 F. Supp. 462,465-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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IV. DETERMINATION AND RESULTS OF INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH A
COURT ORDER
After a court clears the hurdle of determining whether particular conduct
amounts to criminal or civil contempt, it must then determine an appropriate
sanction. The ability of the contemnor to comply with a court order, whether
for the payment of money or otherwise, is a required prerequisite to a finding
of contempt and any sanction in connection therewith. 162 It is axiomatic that
a person may not be held in contempt nor imprisoned nor sanctioned for
failure to comply with a court order if it is impossible to comply. 163 But
while certain affirmative acts, such as the ability to testify, 164 can easily be
determined, the ability to pay a sum of money is more difficult to prove, and
it is even harder to establish that one is unable to pay. Therefore, the
possibility of an unjust confinement emerges most starkly in those cases in
which the contemnor fails to produce disputed assets, and the court
disbelieves her claim that she is unable to do so. The contemnor may be
imprisoned indefinitely simply because she cannot prove a negative.
The contemnor's burden in such situations, and the standard of proof to
which he is held, are not clear. It is important that these uncertainties be
resolved if fundamental due process protections are to be provided to future
contemnors. The recent implementation of the strict provisions of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,165
discussed in Part V, exacerbates this concern as more ordinary debtors are at
risk for becoming contemnors.
162. See Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 613 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[W]e cannot disturb
the state courts' decision that there is no federal constitutional bar to Mr. Chadwick's
indefinite confinement for civil contempt so long as he retains the ability to comply with the
order requiring him to pay over the money at issue.").
163. See id.; see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667-68 (1983) (holding that a
fine may not be converted into a jail sentence simply because of the inability to pay); George
v. Beard, 824 A.2d 393, 396 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) ("Before an offender can be confined
solely for nonpayment of financial obligations he or she must be given an opportunity to
establish inability to pay.").
164. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text; infra notes 189-90 and
accompanying text.
165. Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (amending scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
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A. The Burden and Standard of Proof
The burden and standard of proof utilized to establish an ability to
comply with an order for payment of money are unclear. Indeed, the present
system invites abuse, giving leverage to some creditors that is not available
in ordinary litigation. Generally, the party seeking a civil contempt finding
and sanction bears the initial burden of proof, and once she makes out a
prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the alleged contemnor.
166
However, some courts have required the moving party only to prove a prima
facie case of failure to comply, i.e., pay the judgment, and have placed the
subsequent burden of proving an inability to comply upon the party who
asserts it. 67 This is true even though an ability to comply is an essential
element of contempt. 
168
It is also unclear exactly how persuasively a contemnor must prove
inability to comply. Certain courts apply a "clear and convincing" standard
of proof to contempt cases, 169 while others apply the criminal "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard where imprisonment may be imposed as a
sanction. 70 Moreover, some circuits utilize a presumption of ability to
comply in contempt cases, which a contemnor must overcome. 17 Various
courts have held instead that the contemnor must show that all avenues for
raising funds have been explored and exhausted, 172 or that she has been
diligent and energetic in attempting to do what the court has ordered.
73
166. See Combs v. Ryan's Coal Co., 785 F.2d 970, 984 (lth Cir. 1986); see also
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc., 950 F.2d 1525,
1529 (11 th Cir. 1992).
167. See Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund of Local Union No. 58 v. Gary's Elec.
Serv. Co., 340 F.3d 373, 382-83 (6th Cir. 2003); Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 305 B.R. 510, 520
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004).
168. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. In United States v. Rylander,
however, the Supreme Court indicated that the shifting of the burden may apply only to cases
where the contemnor asserts a present inability to pay at some time after the initial
determination. 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983).
169. See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1321 (3d Cir. 1995); Wellington,
950 F.2d at 1529.
170. See Barrett v. Barrett, 368 A.2d 616, 621 (Pa. 1977).
171. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1948) (stating that while lower courts have
carried over this presumption, it is not necessary to do so in bankruptcy actions, as the
presumption is not contained in the bankruptcy statute).
172. See SEC v. Bilzerian, 112 F. Supp. 2d 12, 26 (D.D.C. 2000); O'Leary v. Moyer's
Landfill, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 218, 219-20 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
173. Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394 (2d Cir. 1989).
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Others have held that the contemnor categorically must prove her inability to
pay in detail 74 and that she made all reasonable efforts to comply. 75 Still
others have held that if the contemnor's inability to pay is self-induced, it is
not a defense to contempt,176 while others require a showing that the
contemnor has "done all within its power" to comply. 77 The Supreme Court
in Maggio v. Zeitz, 178 in yet another permutation of the burden standard, has
held that the presumption of ability to comply should be assessed in light of
the present circumstances of the debtor and not based on a former
determination of her ability to pay. This is especially true when some amount
of time has passed between such a finding and a contempt action, unless "the
time element and other factors make that a fair and reasonable inference."'
' 79
The burden of production is not an easy one, for a contemnor must prove
"'plainly and unmistakably that compliance is impossible."" 80 Since this
determination is reviewed on the "clearly erroneous" standard in federal
courts,18 ! or in some state courts on the "abuse of discretion" standard, 82 the
trial court determination of fact would be difficult to reverse. Thus, the
individual imprisoned for failure to obey a court order requiring the payment
of money is in a far worse position than one accused of a serious crime. The
judge who imposes the obligation-not an impartial jury-decides whether
the burden and standard of proof, frequently less arduous than the criminal
standards, have been met. That judge also decides the contemnor's ability to
comply, and determines the nature and extent of the sanction. The usual rules
of criminal law are stood on their head. It is the contemnor who eventually
174. Pigford v. Veneman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 51, 57-58 (D.D.C. 2004); Bilzerian, 112 F.
Supp. 2d 12; O'Leary, 536 F. Supp. 218.
175. Bilzerian, 112 F. Supp. 2d 12; O'Leary, 536 F. Supp. 218.
176. SEC v. Showalter, 227 F. Supp. 2d 110, 120 (D.D.C. 2002).
177. See Pigford, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 57-58.
178. 333 U.S. 56 (1948).
179. Id. at 65.
180. Huber v. Marine Midland Bank, 51 F.3d 5, 10 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting In re Marc Rich & Co., 736 F.2d 864, 866 (2d Cir. 1984)).
181. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc.,
950 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11 th Cir. 1992) ("We must consider the following issue[] on appeal: ...
whether the district court was clearly erroneous in finding that [the contemnor] failed to prove
that he was unable to comply with the district court's disgorgement order ... ").
182. See, e.g., State ex rel. Buss v. Flynn, No. E2005-00468-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL
1328954 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2006).
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must convince the judge of a negative-that he is unable to pay-or he will
remain incarcerated at the judge's pleasure. 83
The Supreme Court, in two cases involving bankrupts who were cited for
contempt for failure to comply with turnover orders, has recognized that the
passing of time might cause imprisonment to lose its coercive character.184
These opinions suggest that if a reasonable interval of time in jail has failed
to produce compliance, an inability to comply perhaps should be presumed
and the contemnor therefore released.
B. Right to Jury Trial and Length of Confinement
As recently as 1958, the Supreme Court ruled in Green v. United
States 85 that even in criminal contempt cases the contemnor is not entitled to
the jury trial that the Sixth Amendment guarantees in other criminal
proceedings. 186 A decade later, in Bloom v. Illinois,'87 the Court effectively
reversed that ruling and held that in cases of criminal contempt the
contemnor must be afforded a jury trial and other rights of the criminally
accused.1 88 After Green, but before Bloom, the Court decided a case
183. One illustration of how difficult it is to overturn a determination that the
contemnor has the ability to comply can be seen in the case of seventy-two-year-old Manuel
Osete, who has been in prison for over forty months in Tucson, Arizona. See Rosenblum,
supra note 8. Osete has been unable to prove that he is incapable of satisfying the judgment
against him in his divorce from his wife of thirty-seven years. See id. He claims that his ex-
wife and son removed documents from his property in Mexico, and without those documents
he can never prove his inability to comply with the court's order to pay alimony of $10,000
per month. See id. Osete remains in prison and unable to get an order for the production of
those documents, and his source of income, a foundry in Mexico, was forced to close in his
absence. See id.
184. See Maggio, 333 U.S. at 70-71 (noting that while "Maggio makes no explanation
as to the whereabouts... of the property which the [turnover] order, earlier affirmed, declared
him to possess[,] . . . time has elapsed between issuance of [the original turnover] order and
initiation of the contempt proceedings in this case"); Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 366
(1929) ("'I have known a brief confinement to produce the money promptly .... and I have
also known it to fail. Where it has failed, and where a reasonable interval of time has supplied
the previous defect in the evidence, and has made sufficiently certain what was doubtful
before, namely the bankrupt's inability to obey the order, he has always been released ... 
(quoting In re Epstein, 206 F. 568, 570 (E.D. Pa. 1913))).
185. 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
186. Id. at 183.
187. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
188. Id. at 208-09.
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involving civil contempt and ruled that a jury trial and other criminal
procedural protections were not required. 89 That case involved contempt
charges brought against two witnesses for refusal to testify before a grand
jury. 90 The Court concluded that "[tihe conditional nature of the
imprisonment-based entirely upon the contemnor's continued defiance-
justifies holding civil contempt proceedings absent the safeguards of
indictment and jury."' 9 '
Deprived of an impartial jury and other criminal procedural protections,
a civil contemnor is subjected to a decision on the critical issue as to whether
he can in fact comply with a court order made by the same judge or court
that ordered him to perform the act in the first place. That judge also decides
the length of the imprisonment sanction. The judge offended by the
contempt, however, is least likely to be impartial, and may even feel
vindictive toward the contemnor. 192 Indeed, a journalist at the Washington
Post characterized a civil contempt case as having "'increasingly taken the
character of a dispute between [the defendant] and the judge.' 193
The lack of due process protections afforded a contemnor before the
imprisonment sanction can be imposed is significant. Professor Doug
Rendleman has discussed the potential for abuse:
Coercive confinement has an awesome potential for abuse. Power to
imprison is concentrated in a single trial judge. The usual checks against
abuse that precede criminal imprisonment, including a grand jury indictment,
prosecutorial discretion, a jury trial for a sentence of greater than six months,
189. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1966).
190. Id. at 365.
191. Id. at 370-71 (citing Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1960) (Douglas,
J., dissenting)).
192. See Deborah J. Zimmerman, Civil Contemnors, Due Process, and the Right to a
Jury Trial, 3 Wyo. L. REv. 205, 219 (2003); see also Int'l Union, UMWA v. Bagwell, 512
U.S. 821, 831 (1994) ("Unlike most areas of law, where a legislature defines both the
sanctionable conduct and the penalty to be imposed, civil contempt proceedings leave the
offended judge solely responsible for identifying, prosecuting, adjudicating, and sanctioning
the contumacious conduct. Contumacy 'often strikes at the most vulnerable and human
qualities of a judge's temperament,' and its fusion of legislative, executive, and judicial
powers 'summons forth ... the prospect of the most tyrannical licentiousness."' (alteration in
original) (citations omitted)).
193. David J. Harmer, Limiting Incarceration for Civil Contempt in Child Custody
Cases, 4 BYU J. PUB. L. 239, 263 (1990) (quoting Barton Gellman, Lawyer Calls Jailing
Vindictive, Pleads for Dr. Morgan's Release, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1988, at D1).
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the presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
opportunity for an executive pardon, are absent before coercive confinement
begins.1
94
Additionally, there is no sound basis for a distinction between civil and
criminal contempt with respect to the length of imprisonment. Criminal
contempt has statutory guidelines for sentencing, as do other crimes, and
these criminal contempt statutes should provide a useful benchmark for the
length of civil contempt imprisonment. If a debtor has the ability to pay, then
attachment, garnishment, and other remedies are available, which render
confinement unnecessary. If a debtor does not have the ability to pay, she
should not be adjudicated to be in contempt in the first place, and indefinite
confinement will not serve to coerce payment. Of course, there is effectively
no opportunity for a contemnor to earn sufficient assets to pay the amount
ordered if she is in prison. In practice, however, decisions as to the length of
contempt confinement are left to the discretion of the court that imposed the
sanction, and a court's exercise of that discretion has been held "virtually
unreviewable."
95
V. HOW THE RECENT REFORMS TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE MAY
SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE IMPRISONMENT FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT
Bankruptcy is becoming part of American life-more than one million
American households annually are directly affected by bankruptcy.' 96 In
194. Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Contempt Confinement: The
Terminally Stubborn Contemnor, 48 WASH. & LEE L.REv. 185, 190 (1991).
195. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Wellington Precious Metals,
Inc., 950 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 38
(2d Cir. 1983)). However, at least one court has rejected that contention, declaring, "[w]e
cannot settle for a 'virtually unreviewable' exercise of trial court discretion when due process
of law is at stake." Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1, 7 n.5 (D.C. 1989). In Morgan, the court
released a contemnor after a fruitless twenty-three-month confinement. Id. at 1-2; see also In
re Crededio, 759 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting) (warning that civil
contempt imprisonment "is an anomaly in our system ..... [a]s soon as it is clear that the
inducement won't work, the purpose of civil contempt lapses, and the continued imprisonment
of the man becomes penal, and requires a criminal proceeding").
196. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 238 (2001) ("With about one hundred million
households in the United States, in the space of a decade, even allowing for some overlap,....
about 10 percent of the country would have lived through a personal bankruptcy."); see also
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2004, more people filed for bankruptcy than graduated from college or died
from heart attacks. 197 Indeed, in 2004 approximately 1.5 million Americans
filed for bankruptcy. 98 In fact, the bankruptcy filing rate has more than
doubled over the past decade.' 99 Bankruptcy scholars have noted that "no one
is exempt from financial catastrophe. Illness or injury is part of the story for
most bankruptcy petitioners and the central theme for a few." 2°° "[M]iddle-
class people like ourselves [are] increasingly at risk for a sudden economic
collapse. ' 0 ' Over the past generation, families have become more vulnerable
to financial failure, even though a higher percentage of households now have
dual income-earners. 20 2 The ranks of the medically uninsured are rising with
over twenty-three million households without health insurance today.
20 3
Scholars have noted that children currently are more likely to survive their
parents' bankruptcy than their divorce.2° With the increasing emphasis in
our culture on materialism and the credit industry's aggressive marketing
efforts, 205 there is reason to believe that an ever-increasing number of
History of Bankruptcy in the United States, Bankruptcy Statistics, http://www.
lawfirmsoftware.com/free/info/bankruptcy/statistics.htm (last visited June 3, 2006).
197. See Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004).
198. See Jeanne Sahadi, House Passes Bankruptcy Bill: What You Should Know About
a Bill that Will Make It Tougher for Consumers to Clear Their Debts, CNN/MONEY.COM, Apr.
14, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/04/13/pf/bankruptcy_bill. Of those, 1.1 million people
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and there were almost 450,000 Chapter 13 filings. Id. In
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a debtor's assets, minus those exempted by the state, are liquidated and
given to creditors, and many remaining debts are cancelled, thereby creating for the debtor
what is known as a "fresh start." Id. In Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the debtor is put on a
repayment plan of up to five years, and any debts not addressed by the plan are usually
discharged. Id.
199. Letter from Professors of Bankr. & Commercial Law to the U.S. House of
Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 11, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Letter from Professors].
200. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 175 (1989).
201. Id. at 325.
202. See Warren, supra note 197, at 1.
203. Id. at 12 & n.34.
204. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP:
WHY MIDDLE CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 6 (2003).
205. Credit extenders may also begin to reduce their standards of credit worthiness. In
this way, they will be able to attract new customers--customers most likely to have difficulty
meeting their financial obligations. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit
Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 263-64 (1997).
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Americans will over-extend themselves and be forced to seek bankruptcy
206protection.
But to succeed in doing so may not be easy. After an eight-year battle,
largely funded by the banking and credit card industries, the United States
Bankruptcy Code was amended and signed into law on April 20, 20 05 .20
The new law, entitled the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), went into effect on October 17,
2005,208 and was designed to minimize alleged abuses in the bankruptcy
system. 2°9 Indeed, BAPCPA's sponsors have charged that bankruptcy has
become a system "'where deadbeats can get out of paying their debt scott-
free while honest Americans who play by the rules have to foot the bill."'
' 210
BAPCPA will decrease the number of debtors permitted to file under
Chapter 7-more debtors will be required to turn to Chapter 13.ll
Some of the pertinent changes to the bankruptcy laws brought about by
BAPCPA are:
* Under the pre-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Code it was up to a court to
determine if a debtor's case qualified for bankruptcy.212 Under
BAPCPA, the debtor's income is subject to a two-part means
test.213
* This means test is the principal means by which the drafters of
BAPCPA hope to decrease the bankruptcy filing rate. The test
206. Indeed, "[t]he number of consumer bankruptcy filings surged to a record high in
2005." Personal Bankruptcies Hit Record High, CNNMoNEY.coM, Jan. 11, 2006, http://
money.cnn.com/2006/01/l l/pf/personal-bankruptcy/index.htm.
207. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (amending scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
208. See Justin Fox, Three Cheers for Bankruptcy, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 17, 2005,
http://money.cnn.comlmagazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2005/10/17/8358054/index.htm.
209. See generally ROBIN JEWELER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE
"BANKRUirCy ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005" IN THE 109TH
CONGRESS (2005), available at http://www.bna.com/webwatch/bankruptcycrs4.pdf.
210. Bankruptcy This Week, Grassley Renews Effort to Reform Bankruptcy Code:
Bill Includes Permanent Chapter 12 Protection for Farmers, New Consumer Protections, Child
Support Provisions, Feb. 2, 2005, http://www.bankruptcyfinder.com/grassleyspressrelease.
html (quoting Senator Chuck Grassley).
211. See Sahadi, supra note 198.
212. See id.
213. See id.; see also Michael J. Davis, The New Bankruptcy Code: Goodbye
Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, DUPAGE COUNTY BAR ASS'N, June 2005, available at
http://www.dcba.org/brief/junissue/2005/art20605.pdf.
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denies bankruptcy protection to those who are deemed able to
repay their debts. The means test involves comparing a
debtor's income to the median in the state in which the debtor is
located.215
* Debtors will be required to pay for credit counseling.21 6
" The court may not grant Chapter 7 or 13 protection unless the
debtor has completed an educational course in personal finance
approved by the U.S. Trustee.
2 17
" The debtor must provide an extensive list of supporting
documents, including a certification of credit counseling,
evidence of payment from employers, recent tax returns, and a
photo ID.
218
Many scholars argue that BAPCPA will impose undue hardships on
those who can least afford to bear them-namely, the elderly and families
with children. 21 9 The new Bankruptcy Code is highly procedural for
consumers. 22 It is also much more costly for those already in financial
distress. 2 In March 2005, several professors of bankruptcy and commercial
law wrote a letter to the House Committee on the Judiciary, urging that the
House of Representatives decline to support BAPCPA.222 The professors
argued that "[t]he ability to file for bankruptcy and to receive a fresh start
provides crucial aid to families overwhelmed by financial problems. 223
Overall they find BAPCPA "deeply flawed" and detrimental to small
business, the elderly (more than 50% of those over sixty-five are driven to
bankruptcy by medical expenses they cannot pay), and families with
214. See Sahadi, supra note 198; 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2).
215. See Sahadi, supra note 198; 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2).
216. See Sahadi, supra note 198; 11 U.S.C. § 109(h). For a discussion of the credit
counseling requirements, see Don Torgenrud, Bankruptcy Reform: New Disclosure
Requirements for Debtors' Counsel and New Consumer Credit Counseling Requirements,
BANKR. SEC. NEWSL. (State Bar of Mont. Bankr. Section, Helena, Mont.), July 29, 2005, at 2,
available at http://www.montanabar.org/groups/bankruptcysection/072905News.pdf.
217. See Davis, supra note 213; 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(1 1), 1328(g).
218. See Davis, supra note 213; 11 U.S.C. § 521.
219. Letter from Professors, supra note 199.
220. See Davis, supra note 213.
221. Letter from Professors, supra note 199.
222. See id.
223. Id.
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children.224 Many consumer advocates believe this new bill was a gift to the
* 225
credit card business. Companies in that industry are expected to receive
more than $1 billion from repayment plans as a result of the increase in
226Chapter 13 filings.
Apparently the public already realizes the pernicious nature of this new
law. In order to beat the October deadline, bankruptcy filings in August 2005
were up 12% nationwide compared to the same month from the prior year.
227
In fact, hurricane Katrina prompted several lawmakers to suggest that storm
victims along the Gulf Coast get relief from the new law's stricter
228provisions.
The above raises concerns about the potential for an increase in the
number of individuals who are at risk for being imprisoned for civil
contempt for failure to pay a court-ordered debt. Those who are deemed
unsuitable for bankruptcy protection likely will have creditors anxiously
seeking repayment. A court, influenced by the denial of bankruptcy
protection afforded to a particular debtor, may be more apt to assume that
there is indeed a valid debt and the debtor has the means to pay it. The
constellation of legal and financial roadblocks to debt repayment can create
an untenable situation for the debtor and lead to an increasing number of
contemnors. I therefore propose several changes to the current
debtor/contempt scheme.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Judicial Recognition of the Consequences of Imprisonment of Debtors
The judiciary should recognize the varied burdens imposed upon those
imprisoned for failure to pay a court-ordered debt. Time spent in prison
224. Id.
225. See Sahadi, supra note 198.
226. Id.
227. See Timothy Egan, Debtors in Rush to Bankruptcy as Change Nears: October
Deadline Is Set: Revised Law Means Fewer Will Be Able to Have Debts Wiped Clean, N.Y.
TiuEs, Aug. 21, 2005, at Al. But see Bankruptcy Filings Up Despite Reforms,
CNNMONEY.COM, June 12, 2006, available at http://www.stevequayle.com/News.alert/
06_Money/060613.bankruptcy.up.htrnl (noting that while BAPCPA caused bankruptcy filings
to "plunge to a 20-year low in the first quarter of 2006, ... a rapid rise in new cases since then
raises questions about whether the law is working as expected").
228. Mary Williams Walsh & Riva D. Atlas, Storm Victims May Face Curbs on
Bankruptcy: Tighter Law Expected to Deter Court Filings, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 2005, at AI.
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creates problems for the debtor-contemnor that go beyond the deprivation of
liberty. These people, who may already be in dire financial straits, might find
it nearly impossible to raise themselves from debt once saddled with the
stigma of prison time. Employers may be loath to hire a "convict," and a
freed debtor would thereby potentially be destined to work a series of low-
paying jobs. This would be associated mostly with financial survival, rather
than economic recovery.
Additionally, a protracted sentence can effectively remove the debtor
from the work force for so long, that, because of the speed with which
technology progresses, her skill set may be rendered obsolete. When the
debtor is released from prison she may no longer be capable of reentering the
work force where she left it. Furthermore, a debtor's health, especially for
older debtors, might also falter so significantly while in prison that future
employment becomes more difficult or even an impossibility. H. Beatty
Chadwick, the subject of an April 2005 ABC News Primetime television
show,229 is an example of both of these potential consequences. Once an
extremely successful lawyer in the posh suburban mainline of Philadelphia,
Mr. Chadwick has earned "the dubious distinction of the longest time [ever
served in jail] for contempt of court., 230 Mr. Chadwick was jailed in 1995
when a judge ruled that he had hidden his wealth in overseas bank accounts
rather than allow it to fall into the hands of his ex-wife during the course of a
divorce settlement.231 Recently appointed Supreme Court Justice Samuel
Alito authored a Third Circuit opinion upholding Mr. Chadwick's indefinite
confinement, stating that Mr. Chadwick "retains the ability to comply with
the order requiring him to pay over the money at issue. 232 Mr. Chadwick,
233 bewith the exception of filing nine habeas corpus petitions, has been
removed from the ways in which the practice of law has changed over the
past decade. Were he to walk out of prison today, he would likely be
unemployable as a lawyer. Furthermore, Mr. Chadwick has been treated for
229. See Millions in Marital Assets at Heart of Jail Term: Wealthy Lawyer Jailed for a
Decade for Contempt of Court After Divorce, ABC NEws PRnmErIME, Apr. 28, 2005,
http:labcnews.go.com/PrimetimelBusinesslstory?id=712687&page= l [hereinafter Wealthy
Lawyer Jailed].
230. Id.
231. See id. See generally Chadwick v. Del. County Court of Common Pleas, No. Civ.
A. 95-MC-0103, 1995 WL 232500 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 1995).
232. Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 613 (3d Cir. 2002).
233. See Chadwick v. Caulfield, 834 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) ("We note
that this is Chadwick's ninth petition for a writ of habeas corpus.").
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non-Hodgkins Lymphoma and, with his health further falling with every
passing day, it is probable that he will die in prison. 3
Today's restructuring of the American family also makes a prison
sentence less survivable for the families of the contemnor. Too often the
plight of the American family is overlooked in debtor cases. This is a
particular concern because approximately one-third of all children are
presently living in single parent homes. 235 An indefinite prison term for a
single parent would not only cause a significant drain of societal resources,
but more importantly, would have a devastating effect on the children
involved.
B. The Judiciary's Multifaceted Societal Role
When considering whether to impose a sentence for civil contempt upon
a debtor, courts should contemplate the multifaceted role of the bench.
Throughout America's history, politicians and scholars alike have fiercely
debated the role and purpose of the judiciary. Primarily, there are two
prevailing views. On one end of the spectrum lies judicial minimalism or
restraint. In simplified terms, minimalism stems from an understanding of
the constitutional structure that limits the use of judicial review to prevent
judicial overreaching into the political sphere.236 It is based on the idea that
the voting populous and elected representatives should be responsible for
making discretionary political decisions and the judiciary should, therefore,
be deferential to such decisions.237 Scholars such as Cass Sunstein and
Alexander Bickel praise "passive virtues," illustrated when courts decline to
hear particular cases in order to promote democratic debate. 238 Many notable
judges have expressed support of judicial restraint, including Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Learned Hand, Benjamin Cardozo, Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall
Harlan 111, and William Rehnquist.
239
On the other end of the spectrum lies judicial maximalism or activism.
Fundamentally, maximalism expands the use of the power of judicial review,
234. See Wealthy Lawyer Jailed, supra note 229.
235. See Warren, supra note 197, at 9.
236. See Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between
Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REv. 1753, 1777 (2004).
237. See Jack Wade Nowlin, The Constitutional Illegitimacy of Expansive Judicial
Power: A Populist Structural Interpretive Analysis, 89 Ky. L.J. 387, 394-95 (2001).
238. See Jeffrey Rosen, Foreword, 97 MicH. L. REv. 1323, 1326 (1999).
239. Nowlin, supra note 237, at 395,462.
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resulting in a more extensive role for the judiciary in political matters and
less deference to the other political branches. 24° Under this view, the court
system is responsible for protecting the Constitution and democracy itself,
including human rights.24' Justices who exemplify this role of the judiciary
include Earl Warren, William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry
Blackmun.242 Although the battle between these two opposing views
continues, history has shown that the judiciary in many cases, for example
Brown v. Board of Education243 and Roe v. Wade,244 has served the function
of protecting, enhancing, and promoting societal ideals.
Courts on all levels, not exclusively the Supreme Court, should be
responsible for advancing societal values. The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, in Hyle v. Hyle,245 recently embraced this responsibility when
faced with an ex-husband who failed to make payment in accordance with a
child support order.24 The record showed that Logan Hyle quit his job
shortly after the court issued the order, and he failed to make any support
payments or go back to work thereafter.247 Mr. Hyle was charged with civil
contempt seven separate times and served seven consecutive six-month
prison sentences-totaling over three-and-one-half years in jail.24 After
issuing an eighth contempt order, however, the superior court determined
that Mr. Hyle did not have the means to purge his contempt.249 Accordingly,
the court vacated the contempt order and remanded "for the trial court to
determine what conditions [would] be sufficiently coercive yet enable [Hyle]
to comply with the order. ''250 Although responsible for ensuring compliance
with a valid court order, by releasing Mr. Hyle the court in effect conceded
240. Id. at 395.
241. Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Foreword: A Judge on Judging:
The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REv. 16, 36-37 (2002).
242. Nowlin, supra note 237, at 395.
243. 349 U.S. 394 (1955).
244. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
245. 868 A.2d 601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
246. Id. at 603.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 603 & n.2.
249. Id. at 603-05. The court required Mr. Hyle to work and then pay back $2500 in
order to purge the contempt. Id. at 605.
250. Id. at 606.
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that society is not served by imprisonment for contempt where there is no
reasonable possibility to comply.
25 1
The enactment of legislation addressing coercive civil contempt in child
custody cases exemplifies how courts have sometimes inadequately
performed their role as advocates of societal values. To illustrate, in Morgan
v. Foretich2  the contemnor, Dr. Jean Morgan, refused to allow her ex-
husband the court-ordered right to visit their daughter based on her belief
that he had sexually abused the child. 3 Dr. Morgan could not prove the
sexual abuse of their daughter, and subsequently, hid her child from her
254former husband and the court. She was imprisoned for civil contempt for
over twenty-three months.255 Congress took notice of Dr. Morgan's case, and
in 1989, President George H.W. Bush signed the District of Columbia Civil
Contempt Imprisonment Limitation Act of 1989.256 The Act permits a person
to be charged with criminal contempt after six months of incarceration for
civil contempt, and limits civil incarceration without criminal charges to
twelve months.257 It was passed in order to compel the release of Dr. Morgan
and to prevent similar injustices in future child custody cases.258 Although
this law only applies to persons incarcerated for civil contempt in child
custody proceedings in the courts of the District of Columbia,259 it can serve
as a model for other courts to emulate. The policy behind the Act is clear:
society should not tolerate unlimited coercive imprisonment of persons
without due process protections, at least in custody cases. Dr. Morgan, on
251. Id.; see also Godfrey v. Godfrey, 894 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)
(holding that the court must set the conditions to purge a contempt in such a way that the
contemnor has the present ability to comply with the order).
252. 564 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1989).
253. Id. at 1-2.
254. Id. at 1.
255. See id.
256. Pub. L. No. 101-97, 103 Stat. 633 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§
11-741, 11-944 (1990 Supp.)); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-741 (LexisNexis 2001).
257. Id. § 11-741(b)(1), (3)(A).
258. See Zimmerman, supra note 192, at 219-20. Indeed, the D.C. Court of Appeals
ordered Dr. Morgan released two days after the Act went into effect. Id. The court stated "we
are compelled by the record to conclude there is no realistic possibility or substantial
likelihood that further incarceration will coerce Morgan into complying with the trial court's
order to produce her child." Foretich, 564 A.2d at 11.
259. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-741(b).
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multiple occasions, stated that she would never comply with the court order
at the expense of her child's safety, despite her obvious ability to comply.
260
In child custody cases, like the journalist cases, 261 it is clear that the
contemnor "holds the key" to his prison cell. As a result, these cases are
substantially different than civil contempt proceedings concerning debt,
where it is often uncertain whether or not a contemnor has the ability to
comply with the court order. Given that in debtor cases it is often unclear
whether the contemnor can comply with the court order, more, or at least
comparable protections should be provided as those afforded in child custody
matters. As society is not served by imprisonment for civil contempt without
the ability to comply, and the determination of a debtor's ability to comply
can be particularly complex, more procedural protections in these cases are
essential.
C. Due Process Protections
The burden and standard of proof, and the means by which the factual
questions underlying those issues are decided, are part of the broader concern
regarding the process that is due in contempt proceedings. 62 However, the
precise nature of the process that is due implicates the confusing and
imprecise, but still robust, classification of contempt as civil or criminal.2 63
As in criminal matters, in order to reduce erroneous findings of guilt the
standard for determining failure to satisfy a judgment requiring the
satisfaction of a debt should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.2 In a 1948
opinion, Justice Black strongly asserted that the standard for civil contempt
should not be clear and convincing evidence-the current standard in most
courts-but instead should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt so that all
contempt matters involving serious penalties be decided under a uniform
standard.265 Because the current standard of proof is unclear,2 6 the
260. Foretich, 564 A.2d at 2-3.
261. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
262. See supra Part IV.
263. See Int'l Union, UMWA v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 n.3 (1994) ("Numerous
scholars have criticized as unworkable the traditional distinction between civil and criminal
contempt."); see also supra Part III.
264. But see, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (noting that in a civil
case involving a monetary dispute between parties, plaintiffs burden of proof should be "a
mere preponderance of the evidence").
265. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 79 (1948) (Black, J., separate opinion) ("All court
proceedings, whether designated as civil or criminal contempt of court or given some other
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contemnor is at an inherent disadvantage as much of the focus in examining
ability or inability to comply is not on gathering the requisite documents or
compiling a case, but rather determining just what needs to be proven.
The same legal protections should be afforded to all who face
imprisonment for contempt. This includes the Sixth Amendment right to a
trial by jury, in which those seeking a finding of contempt would bear the
burden of proving willful violation of the court order beyond a reasonable
doubt. It is an anomaly to afford those rights where the contempt is labeled
"criminal" but not if the contempt is labeled "civil." There is no cogent basis
for the distinction, as the penalty of imprisonment is in itself serious
punishment. Indeed, the danger of impartiality inherent in contempt
proceedings 267 necessitates the highest degree of procedural safeguards.
Affording the same Sixth Amendment rights to both criminal and civil
contemnors would effectively eliminate the unworkable distinctions between
civil and criminal contempt. The argument that criminal procedural
protections are unnecessary in the civil context because the contemnor can
end his imprisonment at will is unsupportable. For the civil contemnor, the
factual issue that determines his incarceration-ability to comply with the
court's order-is of the same significance as whether the criminally accused
committed the crime of which he stands charged, since the resolution of both
of these issues determines whether the court will order incarceration. The
Supreme Court has assiduously protected the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial for those who face imprisonment for over six months under the
criminal law.268 The imprisonment a civil contemnor faces is no different
than that awaiting a criminal contemnor, and the same due process rights
should be afforded to both. Indeed, one could argue that the civil contemnor
is treated similarly to the worst type of criminal, as both are subjected to life
imprisonment.
name, which may result in fine, prison sentence, or both, should in my judgment require the
same measure of proof, and that measure should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.").
266. See supra Part IV.A.
267. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 325 (1996) (noting that, with the
exception of petty offenses, "[t]he Sixth Amendment guarantees that '[iun all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed"' (quoting Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968))); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490
(2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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Due process concerns also affect the length of imprisonment imposed as
a sanction for contempt. The Third Circuit has declared that "'[i]t is
abhorrent to our concept of personal freedom that the process of civil
contempt can be used to jail a person indefinitely, possibly for life, even
though he or she refuses to comply with the court's order.' 269 Thus, even if
a contemnor is found to have the ability to pay, yet refuses to do so in order
to gain a payoff, at a certain point, after "many months, or perhaps even
several years," the judge should have to release the contemnor since the
requisite function of confinement for contempt-coercing payment-will no
longer be applicable.27°
Additionally, it is important that courts are vigilant in ensuring that
indigent debtors are aware of their right, as indigents, to court-appointed
271
representation. Paradoxically, however, there is no right to counsel to
assist a defendant in proving that he is "indigent" and therefore entitled to an
attorney.272 Indeed, "criminal defendants are not entitled to assistance of
counsel in their attempts to prove that they are entitled to appointed counsel
under the current state of the law. 273 However, courts are constitutionally
required to provide legal assistance to civil contemnors sentenced to
imprisonment, as it has been determined that there is no distinction between
civil contempt and criminal contempt so far as the right to counsel is
concerned. 74 As the Tenth Circuit noted, "The right to counsel, as an aspect
of due process, turns not on whether a proceeding may be characterized as
'criminal' or 'civil,' but on whether the proceeding may result in a
deprivation of liberty. 275
269. In re Grand Jury, 600 F.2d at 424 (quoting Catena v. Seidl, 321 A.2d 225, 228
(N.J. 1974)). Courts also have acknowledged that contempt imprisonment cannot last
"forever." See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thom v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 1985).
270. Jenkins, 760 F.2d at 740 (noting that it may take months or years before it
becomes necessary to conclude that incarceration will no longer serve coercive purposes).
271. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
272. Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 1985).
273. Id. at 1185.
274. ld. at 1183.
275. Id. (citing Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413 (5th Cir. 1983)). Indeed, those
who cannot financially satisfy a judgment for money, and therefore face imprisonment, are in
all likelihood least able to pay a private attorney. BAPCPA likely will leave even more
debtors in the position of facing imprisonment for failure to pay their debts. See supra Part V.
With the dramatically decreased potential for bankruptcy protection, courts should focus on
training court-appointed attorneys in the processes, procedures, and peculiarities of handling a
civil contempt determination. The attorneys need to be well-versed in the changes to the
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D. A New Procedure for the Evaluation of a Debtor's Assets
The accurate determination of the ability to comply in a civil contempt
case involving debt is essential.276 Therefore, I suggest that a specialized
judge or magistrate be responsible in the first instance for overseeing the
compilation and review of documentation necessary to determine the assets
of a particular alleged debtor.277 Much like the role of a probation officer,
who makes sentencing recommendations to judges and often testifies in
court,278 designating a judicial officer who can focus her attention on the
often intricate and intimate investigative work necessary to properly review
an alleged debtor's financial situation will help standardize and streamline
the process of evaluating whether one is capable of paying an alleged debt-
should the judge determine at trial that such a debt indeed exists. In this way,
a degree of uniformity can be attained in what currently is an ad hoc process.
Overseeing the compilation and review of documents necessary to
determine the assets of a particular alleged debtor is an ideal use of a federal
magistrate's authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636,279 and would be appropriate
Bankruptcy Code and how these changes have the potential to affect current and future clients.
In the face of the credit- and bank-friendly provisions of BAPCPA, these attorneys must be
prepared to defend their clients from a lengthy imprisonment in the first instance. If their
clients are indeed imprisoned for civil contempt, the attorneys must continue the battle
throughout their clients' potentially indefinite incarceration.
276. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
277. For a similar discussion of the proposed role of a magistrate in evaluating
plaintiffs' requests to litigate pseudonymously, see Jayne S. Ressler, Privacy, Plaintiffs and
Pseudonyms: The Anonymous Doe Plaintiff in the Information Age, 53 U. KAN. L REV. 195,
237-40 (2004).
278. For a description of the multifaceted role of probation officers and other
correctional treatment personnel, see U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Occupational Outlook Handbook, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos265.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2006).
Probation officers also spend much of their time working for the courts. They
investigate the backgrounds of the accused, write presentence reports, and
recommend sentences. They review sentencing recommendations with offenders and
their families before submitting them to the court. Probation officers may be required
to testify in court as to their findings and recommendations. They also attend hearings
to update the court on offenders' efforts at rehabilitation and compliance with the
terms their sentences.
Id.
279. According to 28 U.S.C. § 636:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary-
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for state magistrates as well. Congress created the judicial position of the
magistrate with the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968.280 The primary purpose
of the federal magistrate judge is to improve the efficiency of the federal
judicial system and reduce the increasing workload of the Article ImI district
court judges.281 In particular, magistrate judges are intended to handle the
many "pretrial and preliminary matters" that arise in a case, thereby allowing
the district court judges to preside over actual trial-related matters.282 While
the states do not have a uniform magistrate structure, it is not uncommon for
state courts to assign certain judges to handle such pretrial or preliminary
(A) a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial
matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on
the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or
information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to
dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action. A
judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A)
where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2000).
280. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§
631-639). Due to the increasing importance of the magistrate, Congress changed the title of
this position to magistrate judge. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5089, 5117 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 631 note).
281. S. REP. No. 96-74, at 3 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1469, 1471-72
(expressing the purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act as "facilitat[ing] a rational division of
labor among judicial officers in the district court, as the magistrate would relieve the judge
from personally hearing each and every pretrial motion or proceeding in the preparation of a
case for trial"); S. REP. No. 92-1065, at 3 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3350, 3351
("[Magistrates] render valuable assistance to the judges of the district courts, thereby freeing
the time of those judges for the actual trial of cases."). The Supreme Court has also affirmed
the intentions of Congress in establishing the position of the federal magistrate. See, e.g.,
Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 934 (1991); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 142
(1991); Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 268 (1976); Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 463
(1974).
282. H.R. REP. No. 94-1609, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6167
("[T]he use of a magistrate [under the Federal Magistrates Act] will further the congressional
intent that the magistrate assist the district judge in a variety of pretrial and preliminary
matters thereby facilitating the ultimate and final exercise of the adjudicatory function at the
trial of the case.... Without the assistance furnished by magistrates in hearing matters of this
kind .... the [trial] judges of the district courts would have to devote a substantial portion of
their available time to various procedural steps rather than to the trial itself.").
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matters on a regular basis.283 Thus, the duty of reviewing the assets of an
alleged debtor can be delegated to state judicial officers who handle the
preliminary matters of a case, similar to the federal magistrate judge.
The power of the magistrate judge to handle "pretrial matters" is
statutorily authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and implemented by Rule
72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.284 While no definition of the term
"pretrial" exists in either the statute or Rule 72, the legislative history of 28
U.S.C. § 636 and the purpose of the magistrate judge in easing the workload
of the district court judges suggest a liberal interpretation. 285 Aside from
pretrial matters, the district courts may also assign "additional duties" to the
magistrate judges that "are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States. '286 As evidenced by the legislative history and the
enabling statute itself, the magistrate judge has become an indispensable
figure in the federal judiciary. The compilation and review of an alleged
debtor's assets fits squarely within the duties of the magistrate judge.
The specialized judge or magistrate would have numerous functions.
Primarily, she would make a thorough evaluation of an alleged debtor's
assets. After doing so, the specialized judge or magistrate would present the
debtor's asset profile to the court, which would use that information after
determining whether or not the creditor's claim was valid. Over time
specialized judges or magistrates would develop an expertise and efficiency
in determining the assets of an alleged debtor, and they could continue their
involvement with the case should problems develop throughout the course of
the litigation. This would increase judicial efficiency by freeing the courts
from the often time-consuming efforts necessary to uncover and compile an
alleged debtor's assets. Courts would be able to focus their attention on the
283. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 22 ("The Legislature may provide for the
appointment by trial courts of record of officers such as commissioners to perform
subordinate judicial duties." (emphasis added)).
284. 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGr, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARcus, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3068 (2d ed. 1997). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R.
Civ. P. 72.
285. H.R. REP. No. 94-1609, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6169 ("Under
[28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)] a judge, in his discretion may assign any pretrial matter to be
heard and determined by motions and matters which can arise in the preliminary processing of
either a criminal or a civil case." (emphasis added)).
286. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). The main purpose of this "catchall" provision is to allow
the district courts to freely experiment with "the assignment of other duties to magistrates
which may not necessarily be included in the broad category of 'pretrial matters."' H.R. REP.
No. 94-1609, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6172.
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validity of the creditor's claims. Although some might argue that it would be
appropriate for the court trying the merits of the action to be exposed at the
outset to alleged debtors who may be acting in bad faith, having a specialized
judge or magistrate handle these cases in the first instance will reduce the
number and types of problems inherent in the current system.
The role of the specialized judge or magistrate should not be limited to
the pretrial stage but should extend to the post-judgment stage as well. The
specialized judge or magistrate should be responsible for presenting the
debtor's financial information during the debtor's appeal(s) of her sentence.
As noted, the "key" to a debtor's cell may change over the course of her
287imprisonment. The magistrate can provide information to the court as to
whether continued confinement would accomplish its coercive purpose.
Additionally, involving a magistrate at this stage of the proceedings will
diminish the concern that the judge will view the contemnor's refusal to pay
as a personal affront.
One might wonder who would pay the cost for the utilization of a
specialized judge or magistrate. A possible solution is the imposition of a
fine upon those actually found to have adequate assets to comply with a court
order. On the other hand, if the debtor is in fact found to be legitimately
unable to comply, no fees would be assessed by the court. This proposal
bears similarity to recoupment statutes that provide for reimbursement to the
government for certain costs it incurs on behalf of those who have or who
can obtain the means to repay.as In this manner, those legitimately in
contempt further would be penalized while those honestly without means to
satisfy a court order would benefit from a more uniform and streamlined
process.
287. See Rosenblum, supra note 8.
288. The most frequently applied recoupment statutes are those involving recovery of
funds spent on court-appointed representation. While the statutes vary from state to state, they
generally require criminal defendants to repay the costs of representation if the defendants
were indigent at the time the court appointed counsel, but later became able to pay. See, e.g.,
Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do
Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the
Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 181, 218 (1998). One state requires a mother who receives
prenatal and post-partum medical assistance under the Social Security Act to cooperate in
efforts to recoup the costs of such medical assistance from the unwed fathers of the children.
See Perry v. Dowling, 963 F. Supp. 231, 232 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (seeking reimbursement for
the costs of medical assistance).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
presents both a challenge and an opportunity for our legal system. Some of
the most vulnerable people in our society, those in financial distress, risk
being imprisoned for failure to pay a court-ordered debt. This raises
important concerns about procedural fairness. In order to protect the rights of
debtors, several changes to the current system are necessary. First, courts
should assume a broad and more cosmopolitan view of the particular
consequences of incarcerating those in debt. The judiciary should be
cognizant of its multifaceted role in society, and determine whether
incarceration for civil contempt, without an ability to comply, truly advances
a societal interest. Additionally, debtors facing civil contempt should be
afforded the same due process protections as criminal defendants. Finally, a
specialized judge or magistrate should oversee the compilation and review of
the documentation necessary to determine the assets of a particular alleged
debtor, as well as participate in the reevaluation of the contemnor's
circumstances on appeal. The goal of these recommendations is to provide
informed guidelines to a capricious process in need of reform. Accordingly,
societal interests may be advanced through the proper administration of
justice.
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